Russian Propaganda Strategies: Employment of Shields, Swords, and Social Media Tactics in Disinformation Campaigns
In the rapidly evolving digital landscape, the field of disinformation has seen a significant transformation, with AI-based applications playing a prominent role. This transformation was evident in the 2025 German federal election, where Russian disinformation found its way into the training data for large language models like ChatGPT and Gemini.
Russian disinformation activities targeted this election, aiming to influence public opinion, discredit established parties, and support the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. The campaign was likely conducted by Russian state actors, including the GRU (Russian military intelligence) and its special unit 54.777, which operates front organizations such as Inforos. The state agency Rossotrudnitchestvo, under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was also linked to these activities.
The modern information environment, with platforms like Facebook, YouTube, Telegram, TikTok, and others, allowed disinformation actors to directly target audiences abroad. Russian state media, such as RT and Sputnik, formed partnerships with media outlets in Africa and Latin America, leading to authoritarian, anti-Western alliances.
Russian disinformation tactics extended beyond elections, targeting Ukrainian refugees in Europe, the Ukrainian government, NATO, and democratic parties and institutions. The campaign was not limited to the production and distribution of disinformation but also involved the mass-production and filling of entire websites with AI-generated content.
Russian propaganda tactics include document falsification, false-flag actions, recruiting influence agents from pro-Russian activists and politicians, and creating seemingly independent organizations to spread propaganda. For instance, the state-funded video platform Redfish was succeeded by RED, which denied ties to the Russian state but spread divisive messages and narratives from Hamas.
RT, positioned as an antidote to Western mainstream media, targeted democratic-skeptic groups with conspiracy theories, amplifying corona-skeptics and anti-vaxxers during the COVID-19 pandemic. Private companies specializing in influence campaigns, like the Social Design Agency (SDA), were commissioned by the Kremlin for covert foreign influence campaigns.
Digital propaganda became increasingly important for the Kremlin in the 2010s, as the internet provided a space for independent media, bloggers, and citizens to act and express their opinions. Russian diplomatic representations abroad, protected by diplomatic status, actively denied Russian war crimes and justified the war of aggression, as seen in their social media accounts during the large-scale invasion in Ukraine.
The market economy provided favorable conditions for digital disinformation and propaganda, with methods developed in a thriving market for search engine optimization and digital marketing being used. Russian disinformation aims to permanently influence the opinion-forming process, destroy the shared factual basis for political debates, and weaken democratic institutions.
In the face of these challenges, it is crucial for democratic societies to remain vigilant and informed, fostering a culture of critical thinking and fact-checking to combat the spread of disinformation.
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